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Date: 09-27-2018
Case Style:
STATE OF OHIO vs. DAVET SHELTON
Case Number: C-170547
Judge: Beth A. Myers
Court: COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
Plaintiff's Attorney: Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott M. Heenan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Defendant's Attorney: Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and David Hoffmann, Assistant Public Defender
Description:
On June 24, 2016, 87-year-old James Hayes was attacked and robbed
in the parking lot of a LaRosa’s restaurant in the Corryville area. A grand jury
returned an indictment charging Shelton with the following offenses relating to the
attack on Hayes: five counts of aggravated robbery, four counts of felonious assault,
one count of theft from an elderly person, and two counts of theft.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
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{¶5} The following evidence was adduced at the jury trial. Hayes testified
that on the date of the offenses, he was scheduled to work at the LaRosa’s in
Corryville. He arrived in his white Hyundai and parked in front of the restaurant at
approximately 3:30 a.m. to meet a delivery truck. Surveillance videos taken from
neighboring businesses show that while Hayes sat in his parked car, a blue Nissan
drove past him two times and then parked across the street from him. An African
American male wearing black pants, a white tank top, a ball cap, and a white towel
draped around his neck exited from the blue Nissan and walked past Hayes’s car
before returning to the vehicle and driving away. The blue Nissan drove past Hayes’s
vehicle for a third time just minutes later.
{¶6} The surveillance videos then show a similarly dressed African
American male walk up from behind Hayes’s car and stand next to it for a moment
before walking away. The person in the video was wearing a black shirt or
sweatshirt, but still had a white towel draped around his neck.
{¶7} A short while later, the videos show an African-American male wearing
black pants, a black sweatshirt, and a red ball cap, walk up and stand next to Hayes’s
car for a period of time. This person was carrying what appeared to be a red gasoline
container.
{¶8} Hayes testified that he did not remember seeing the blue Nissan drive
by, but that he did recall an individual standing next to his car for several minutes.
When the delivery truck arrived, Hayes drove his car to the lot behind the restaurant,
where he was attacked. The attack on Hayes was captured on a security camera, and
it shows that an African-American male, wearing black pants and a black sweatshirt,
and carrying a red gasoline container, approached Hayes just after he exited from his
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
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vehicle. The assailant threw two rocks at Hayes and his vehicle, one of which broke a
rear window on the car. He then struck Hayes on his back with a brick, knocking
Hayes to the ground. While Hayes was on the ground, the assailant used Hayes’s
cane to beat him, punched him in the face, rifled through his pockets, and drove
away in Hayes’s car.
{¶9} Hayes provided an inventory of the items that had been in his stolen
car, including a pool stick, bowling balls, a chair, CDs, a vacuum, and jumper cables.
His wallet was also stolen from his person. Hayes suffered much bruising on his
back and missed several days of work because of the pain. While testifying, he
identified Shelton as his assailant.
{¶10} Hayes’s vehicle was recovered from a nearby street the following day.
A mask and a Swisher Sweets cigar wrapper were found in the vehicle. Hayes
testified that these items did not belong to him.
{¶11} A palm print belonging to Don August Kemper was found on Hayes’s
car. Cincinnati Police Officer Christopher Bihl, who had investigated these crimes,
testified that he had interviewed Kemper and that Kemper was too large to be the
person on the surveillance video. Kemper told the police that someone named
“David” had picked him up in a white car and driven him around. After speaking
with Kemper’s mother Denise Arnold, Officer Bihl determined that Shelton was the
“David” referenced by Kemper.
{¶12} Both Kemper and Arnold testified at trial. Arnold explained that
Shelton lived next door to her, and that Kemper had always called him “David,”
instead of “Davet.” Kemper testified that Shelton picked him up one morning in a
white car. Kemper admitted that he had previously told the police that Shelton had
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
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taken the car from a man who he had “[gotten] into it with” and then knocked out.
After they drove around in the stolen car, Shelton parked the car and left Kemper
sitting in it. Shelton later returned driving a blue car, which he used to take Kemper
home.
{¶13} Several weeks after the attack on Hayes, following a police pursuit,
Shelton was stopped while driving a blue Nissan with North Carolina license plates
numbered DHD4542. Inside the car, officers discovered Swisher Sweets wrappers, a
red hat similar to the hat worn in the surveillance video, a white towel, a Scarface t
shirt, CDs belonging to Hayes, a Dirt Devil vacuum, a chair, and bullets. A
personalized license plate from Hayes’s car was also found in the blue Nissan.
{¶14} During a search of Shelton’s apartment, officers found a pool stick,
boxes of ammunition, shotgun shells, and a Swisher Sweets cigar wrapper. In the
basement storage unit assigned to Shelton, officers found a red gas container and a
red bag containing jumper cables. Officer Bihl testified that both the blue Nissan and
Shelton’s apartment were cluttered and had items scattered everywhere.
{¶15} Officer Bihl searched Shelton’s Facebook page, where he found various
pictures that collectively depicted Shelton with a cigar in his mouth, Shelton wearing
a towel around his neck, and Shelton wearing a Scarface t-shirt similar to the shirt
found during the search of the blue Nissan.
{¶16} Precious Wright, Shelton’s former girlfriend, testified that she had
rented a blue Nissan Sentra with a North Caroline license plate numbered DHD4542
for Shelton to drive. She was unaware if Shelton allowed anyone else to drive the car.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
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{¶17} Joan Burke, a serologist with the Hamilton County Coroner’s
laboratory, testified that she found Shelton’s DNA on both a mask and a Swisher
Sweets cigar wrapper recovered from Hayes’s vehicle.
{¶18} Shelton presented testimony from Officer Patrick Moran, a civilian
crime scene investigator with the Cincinnati Police Department. Officer Moran had
received prints lifted from Hayes’s car during the investigation and had run the
prints in an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (“AFIS”) database. The
AFIS database returned a hit on the lifted prints, matching them to prints belonging
to Kemper.
{¶19} The jury found Shelton guilty of all offenses. After merger, Shelton
was ultimately convicted of one count of aggravated robbery, one count of felonious
assault, and theft from an elderly person. He was sentenced to 11 years’
imprisonment for the aggravated-robbery conviction, eight years’ imprisonment for
the felonious-assault conviction, and one year’s imprisonment for the theft-from-an
elderly-person conviction. These sentences were made consecutive, resulting in an
aggregate sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment.
Denial of Motion for a Continuance
{¶20} In his first assignment of error, Shelton argues that the trial court
erred in failing to grant his motion for a continuance.
{¶21} After the jury was selected, the state disclosed to defense counsel that
fingerprints belonging to Kemper had been found on Hayes’s car, and that it did not
intend to call the criminalist who had identified the fingerprints to testify. The state
had not disclosed this information at an earlier date because it had previously filed,
and been granted, a motion for nondisclosure under Crim.R. 16, in which the trial
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
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court ordered that the identification of Kemper could be withheld until the day of
trial. After receiving this information, defense counsel subpoenaed records relating
to the fingerprints and updated his witness list to include the criminalist. The state
had indicated to defense counsel that it believed counsel would receive the requested
materials later that day. Before opening statement, counsel asked for a two-day
continuance because he did not want to begin the case without these materials.
Counsel was worried he would not receive the information and that he would need
time to review it. He also wanted to subpoena the criminalist for trial. The trial
court denied the motion, noting that counsel was to receive the material that day,
which would give him time to review it.
{¶22} A trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a
continuance. State v. Myers, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2018-Ohio-1903, __ N.E.3d __, ¶
92; State v. Brice, 2017-Ohio-974, 86 N.E.3d 896, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.). A defendant must
show that she or he was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to grant a requested
continuance. Myers at ¶ 92. An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s
decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Brice at ¶ 10, citing AAAA
Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redev. Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161,
553 N.E.2d 597 (1990).
{¶23} Following our review of the record, we cannot find that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying Shelton’s motion for a continuance. The trial court,
when denying the requested continuance, indicated that because Shelton would
receive the requested paperwork and materials later that day, defense counsel would
have time to review and prepare while the state put on its case-in-chief. The trial
court did not discount defense counsel’s reason for requesting the continuance, but
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
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felt that a continuance was not necessary for counsel to adequately represent
Shelton.
{¶24} We further hold that Shelton suffered no prejudice from the denial of
his continuance, as his counsel received the requested information and called the
criminalist who had identified the fingerprints to testify. Moreover, Officer Bihl had
explained that Kemper’s palmprints had led him to investigate Shelton. And counsel
was also able to cross-examine Kemper as to why his prints had been found on
Hayes’s car.
{¶25} The first assignment of error is overruled.
Evid.R. 404(B)
{¶26} In his second assignment of error, Shelton argues that the trial court
erred in admitting photographs depicting ammunition in violation of Evid.R. 404(B).
{¶27} Over Shelton’s objection, the trial court allowed the state to introduce
photographs taken during searches of Shelton’s apartment and the blue Nissan. The
objected to photographs from the vehicle included pictures depicting a bullet hole,
bullets, and shell casings. The challenged photographs from the apartment included
pictures showing boxes of ammunition, bullets, shell casings, shotgun shells, and
pellet guns. Shelton argues that these photographs were admitted in violation of
Evid.R. 404(B) and that they led to an inference that he was violent and had a
dangerous character. In support of his argument, he relies on State v. Thomas, 152
Ohio St.3d 15, 2017-Ohio-8011, 92 N.E.3d 821. In Thomas, the court reversed the
appellant’s convictions after determining that evidence of weapons not used in the
commission of the underlying offenses had been admitted to portray appellant as a
person of violent character who had acted in conformity with that trait in violation of
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
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Evid.R. 404(B) and R.C. 2945.59, and had been so prejudicial that there was a
reasonable probability that admission of the evidence had affected the outcome of
the trial. Id. at ¶ 48.
{¶28} While Shelton argues on appeal that these photographs were admitted
in violation of Evid.R. 404(B), he objected below on the grounds that the
photographs were irrelevant and were more prejudicial than probative because no
gun had been used in the commission of the offenses against Hayes. Typically we
review the trial court’s admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. See State v.
Crossty, 2017-Ohio-8382, 99 N.E.3d 1048, ¶ 28 (1st Dist.); State v. Johnson, 144
Ohio St.3d 518, 2015-Ohio-4903, 45 N.E.3d 208, ¶ 53. But because Shelton failed to
raise an Evid.R. 404(B) objection below, we review the argument for plain error. See
State v. Steelman, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170337, 2018-Ohio-1732, ¶ 15. Plain
error is “(1) an error, (2) that is obvious, and (3) that affected the outcome of the
trial.” Id., citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002); see
Crim.R. 52(B).
{¶29} Evid.R. 404(B) provides that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.”
{¶30} The state argues that because the photographs depicted ammunition
and shell casings strewn about both Shelton’s apartment and the blue Nissan, the
similar nature of the items in the cluttered spaces established Shelton’s possession of
the blue Nissan. Since this vehicle is linked to the crime, it is evidence of Shelton’s
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
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identity as the perpetrator of the offenses against Hayes. The state also introduced
for this same purpose photographs showing distinctive cigar wrappers strewn about
the blue Nissan and apartment. We find that the evidence was admissible as proof of
identity under Evid.R. 404(B).
{¶31} Shelton further argues that if the evidence was used to link him to the
Nissan, it was more prejudicial than probative under Evid.R. 403. We disagree.
Shelton disputed his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses and argued he did not
drive the blue Nissan that day. His counsel further argued that Kemper could have
committed the crimes and driven the Nissan that day. Linking Shelton to the blue
Nissan was relevant to establishing his identity as Hayes’s attacker. The probative
value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by any danger of unfair
prejudice. No error, plain or otherwise, resulted from the trial court’s admission of
the evidence.
{¶32} The second assignment of error is overruled.
In-Court Identification
{¶33} In his third assignment of error, Shelton argues that admission of the
victim’s in-court identification constituted plain error and deprived him of due
process. Shelton concedes that because he failed to object to the identification
below, we review for plain error. Steelman, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170337, 2018
Ohio-1732, at ¶ 15; Myers, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2018-Ohio-1903, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶
125.
{¶34} While testifying, Hayes identified Shelton as his attacker. Shelton
argues that Hayes’s identification was not based upon an independent observation at
the scene and was unreliable.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
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{¶35} An in-court identification will be admissible “if the identification
comes from ‘some independent recollection and observation of the accused by the
witness’ as established under the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Norman,
137 Ohio App.3d 184, 201, 738 N.E.2d 403 (1st Dist.1999), quoting State v. Jackson,
26 Ohio St.2d 74, 77, 269 N.E.2d 118 (1971); State v. Williams, 1st Dist. Hamilton
No. C-081148, 2010-Ohio-1879, ¶ 8. “Reliability is the linchpin in determining the
admissibility of identification testimony.” State v. Moody, 55 Ohio St.2d 64, 67, 377
N.E.2d 1008 (1978), quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243,
53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977). When considering the reliability of an in-court identification
under the totality of the circumstances, relevant factors to consider include “the
opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’
degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of
time between the crime and the confrontation.” Id., quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409
U.S. 188, 199, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); see Norman at 201.
{¶36} Here, Hayes testified that he had not had much opportunity to look at
his attacker, and he had described his assailant as having a height of 5’9”, whereas
Shelton is 6’4”. Hayes identified Shelton with certainty at the jury trial, which
occurred approximately one year after the attack. He had also identified Shelton as
his attacker during a pretrial deposition. Hayes had failed to pick Shelton out of a
photographic lineup presented to him several weeks after the attack, but he
explained that he had not been wearing his glasses when viewing the lineup.
{¶37} Although several of these factors call into question the reliability of
Hayes’s identification, following our review of the record we find that no plain error
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
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resulted from Hayes’s in-court identification of Shelton. Further, in light of the
overwhelming evidence of Shelton’s guilt, as explained in our analysis of the fourth
assignment of error, we cannot find that the outcome of the proceedings would have
been different but for the in-court identification. See Williams at ¶ 9.
Sufficiency and Weight
{¶38} In his fourth assignment of error, Shelton argues that his convictions
were not supported by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of
the evidence. He specifically argues that the state failed to establish his identity as
the perpetrator of the offenses.
{¶39} The record contains sufficient evidence that Shelton committed the
offenses against Hayes. Prior to the attack on Hayes, a blue Nissan had driven past
him multiple times while he waited for the delivery truck in front of LaRosa’s. Ample
evidence linked Shelton to a blue Nissan: Shelton’s former girlfriend Precious
Wright testified that she had rented a blue Nissan for him to drive; he was arrested in
that same blue Nissan; he had driven Kemper around in a blue vehicle; the blue
Nissan was found in the same condition as Shelton’s apartment (cluttered, with
ammunition and cigar wrappers scattered around); and Shelton’s personal items
were found in the blue Nissan after his arrest. Additionally, the person driving the
blue Nissan on the morning of the attacks had been wearing a white towel around his
neck. A white towel was found in the blue Nissan following Shelton’s arrest. And
Officer Bihl discovered photos of Shelton on Facebook in which he wore a white
towel around his neck. A red hat similar to the hat worn by the suspect in the
surveillance video was also found in the blue Nissan.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
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{¶40} In addition to linking him to the Nissan, overwhelming evidence
established that Shelton was Hayes’s attacker. Searches of both the Nissan and
Shelton’s apartment revealed items that had been stolen from Hayes, including
Hayes’s CDs, vacuum cleaner, jumper cables, and pool stick. A license plate for
Hayes’s vehicle was found in the blue Nissan when Shelton was arrested. A mask
and a Swisher Sweets cigar wrapper containing Shelton’s DNA had been found in
Hayes’s vehicle when it was recovered. Further, the jury heard testimony from
Kemper that Shelton had picked him up in a white car that he admitted taking from a
guy he had “[gotten] into it with.”
{¶41} We find that after viewing all probative evidence and reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury could reasonably
have determined that Shelton committed these offenses and found the elements of
the offenses proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d
172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶42} We further find that Shelton’s convictions were not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. The jury was presented with testimony that
Kemper’s prints had been found on Hayes’s car. But it also heard Kemper’s
explanation of why he had been in the car, along with Officer Bihl’s testimony that
Kemper’s build did not match that of the person captured on the surveillance video.
The jury was in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and it was
entitled to reject any argument that Kemper had committed these offenses. See State
v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus.
The jury did not lose its way and commit such a manifest miscarriage of justice in
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
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finding Shelton guilty that his convictions must be reversed. See State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).
{¶43} Shelton’s convictions were supported by both the sufficiency and the
weight of the evidence. The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
Allied Offenses
{¶44} In his fifth assignment of error, Shelton argues that the trial court
violated R.C. 2941.25 by imposing multiple sentences on allied offenses of similar
import that were not committed separately or with a separate animus. Because
Shelton raised this argument before the trial court, and because the court made a
merger determination, we conduct a de novo review. State v. Corcoran, 1st Dist.
Hamilton No. C-160627, 2017-Ohio-7084, ¶ 15; State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d
482, 2012-Ohio-5699, 983 N.E.2d 1245, ¶ 1.
{¶45} Under R.C. 2941.25, separate sentences may be imposed on a
defendant whose conduct supports multiple offenses if the offenses were dissimilar
in import, were committed separately, or were committed with a separate animus.
State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, paragraph three of
the syllabus; State v. Bailey, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-140129, 2015-Ohio-2997, ¶ 76.
{¶46} Shelton argues that his convictions for the offenses of felonious assault
and theft from an elderly person should have merged into his conviction for
aggravated robbery.
{¶47} We first consider whether Shelton could have been separately
sentenced for the offenses of aggravated robbery and felonious assault. Shelton was
convicted of aggravated robbery pursuant to R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), which provides that:
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
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(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined
in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately
after the attempt or offense, shall do any of the following:
(1) Have a deadly weapon on or about the offender’s person or under
the offender’s control and either display the weapon, brandish it,
indicate that the offender possesses it, or use it.
{¶48} He was convicted of felonious assault under R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), which
provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly * * * [c]ause or attempt to cause physical
harm to another or to another’s unborn by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous
ordnance.”
{¶49} Following our review of the record, we find that these two offenses
were committed with a separate animus. We have explained that animus, or one’s
immediate motive or purpose, is determined by “dissecting the facts and
circumstances in evidence, including the means used to commit the offense.” Bailey,
1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-140129, 2015-Ohio-2997, at ¶ 86.
{¶50} During the attack in this case, Shelton threw two rocks at Hayes and
his vehicle, and then struck Hayes in the back with a brick, which knocked him to the
ground. While Hayes, an 87-year-old man, was on the ground, Shelton beat Hayes
with Hayes’s own cane and punched him in the face. The force used during the
felonious assault was much more than was necessary to effectuate the aggravated
robbery, and it demonstrated that Shelton acted with a specific intent to harm Hayes,
separate from any animus to rob him. See Bailey at ¶ 87; State v. Sutton, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga Nos. 102300 and 102302, 2015-Ohio-4074, ¶ 62 (holding that “where a
defendant uses greater force than necessary to complete aggravated robbery, he
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
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shows a separate animus.”). Because these offenses were committed with a separate
animus, the trial court did not err in imposing separate sentences for each offense.
{¶51} We reach a different conclusion with respect to the offenses of
aggravated robbery and theft from an elderly person. Shelton was convicted of theft
from an elderly person in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(4), which provides that:
(A) No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or
services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the
property or services in any of the following ways:
* * *
(4) By threat.
To find Shelton guilty of this offense, the jury additionally had to find that the state
had proven that Hayes was 65 years of age or older.
{¶52} The record establishes that after knocking Hayes to the ground and
beating him, Shelton rifled through Hayes’s pockets, took his wallet, grabbed his
keys, and then drove away in Hayes’s car. No temporal break occurred between the
commission of the theft and aggravated-robbery offenses, see State v. Wright, 2d
Dist. Montgomery No. 24276, 2011-Ohi0-4874, ¶ 78-79, and the offenses were
committed as part of the same course of conduct with a single state of mind. See
State v. Ayers, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2010-12-119 and CA2010-12-120, 2011
Ohio-4719, ¶ 37 (holding that appellant’s convictions for aggravated robbery and
grand theft were committed with the same conduct where appellant had broken into
a Save-a-Lot store, stolen money from the safe, locked employees in a freezer, taken
car keys from an employee, and fled in an employee’s car).
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
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{¶53} We further find that the offenses of aggravated robbery and theft from
an elderly person or disabled adult were not dissimilar in import. In Ruff, the court
explained when offenses are of dissimilar import, stating that “offenses are not allied
offenses of similar import if they are not alike in their significance and their resulting
harm.” Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, at ¶ 21. Here,
Shelton’s conduct “victimized one person in a single event, thus the harm was not
separate and distinct.” State v. Wright, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170278, 2018
Ohio-877, ¶ 3 (finding that two theft offenses were of similar import where the
appellant had broken into a vehicle and stolen two credit cards from the same
person).
{¶54} We additionally note that the trial court correctly merged Shelton’s
two theft convictions with the aggravated-robbery conviction. The reasoning that
applies to theft applies equally to theft from an elderly person. The conduct of the
perpetrator is the same; it is the victim’s age that enhances the offense. If theft is an
allied offense to aggravated robbery, so is theft from an elderly person. The offenses
of theft and theft from an elderly person were committed with the same conduct.
The only distinguishing factor between the offenses is the age of the victim.
{¶55} Because the offenses of aggravated robbery and theft from an elderly
person were allied offenses of similar import, we find that the trial court erred by
imposing separate sentences for each offense. The fifth assignment of error is
sustained in part and overruled in part.
Outcome: Because the offenses of aggravated robbery and theft from an elderly
person were allied offenses of similar import, we vacate the sentences imposed for those offenses. This matter is remanded to the trial court for the state to elect which allied offense to pursue for sentencing. The judgment of the trial court is otherwise affirmed.
Judgment affirmed in part, sentences vacated in part, and cause remanded.
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